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Environmental lobbying with imperfect monitoring of 
environmental quality 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance 
environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of 
environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality.  
We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfect 
and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private 
monitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in the 
context of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farm 
extension programmes highlighted. 
 
Keywords: Game theory, public choice, imperfect public monitoring, imperfect private 
monitoring, non-point source pollution, agricultural extension and public education 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
While environmental standards have become the norm to address traditional point source 
pollution such as smoke stacks and effluent treatment plants in urban settings, the issue of 
non-point source pollution in rural land use systems remains highly politically charged. 
Recent debate on the matter has occurred in Australia particularly with regard to potential 
impacts of agricultural non-point source pollution on the coastal ecosystem in the Great 
Barrier Reef region. In Europe, the proposals in a variety of countries towards 
implementation of the European Union water framework directive are the topic of recent 
policy debates. There is an extensive literature on agricultural non-point source pollution 
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dealing both on the theory and practice, where the debate has recently moved from traditional 
regulatory control to voluntary approaches for prevention and mitigation. Key contributions 
have included Braden and Segerson (1991), Lichtenberg, Strand et al. (1993), Horan and 
Ribaudo (1999) and  Ribaudo, Horan et al. (1999). While transaction costs have featured 
prominently in the discussions on effective policy design to address market failure (Smith 
and Tomasi 1995) impacting on public good environmental quality, most of the related 
studies appear to overlook the role of the political process that may potentially determine 
how and when governments intervene in correcting the externality. Government interest for 
policy intervention has often been analysed in terms of two explanatory theories of 
regulation: first, public interest theory, that suggests government action must aim to produce 
an optimum level of well-being for the entire population of a country; while the second, 
economic theory of regulation, considers that well-organized groups engages in activities to 
influence government decision-making in their favour (Olson 1965; Stigler 1971). 
 
A number of papers have analysed the political economy of environmental lobbying from a 
public choice perspective. Well known contributions to the literature include Lee (1985), 
Brooks and Heijdra (1987), Migue and Marceau (1993), Damania (1999), Wilson and 
Damania (2005) and Polk and Schmutzler (2005). This literature has, for the most part 
ignored the problem of monitoring environmental quality, despite much of the work featuring 
a tacit assumption of perfect monitoring of environmental quality. Consequently one could 
term the resultant political (politico-economic) equilibrium a perfect public politico-
economic equilibrium to borrow from the literature on perfect public equilibria.  
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There is also a considerable literature on private versus public monitoring with both perfect 
and imperfect information, that would appear to have clear relevance to the question of how 
environmental monitoring impacts on the political process, i.e. environmental politics and the 
politico-economic equilibrium. This literature has developed in the context of the theory of 
repeated games (See, for example; Mailath and Samuelson 2005) . In the model presented 
here we examine monitoring issues in the context of a multi-stage game rather than a 
repeated game. This literature begins with Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990). The 
distinction between perfect and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality is of 
particular relevance to considerations of non-point source pollution problems, because 
monitoring costs for non-point source pollution are likely to be higher than for point source 
pollution due to the diffuse nature of the pollution discharge. Because farm pollution is for 
the most part non-point source in nature, and despite the relative ease of monitoring 
application rates for fertilisers and pesticides, monitoring nutrient run-off and pesticide run-
off into the environment is fraught with numerous difficulties. Therefore, it is important to 
recognise that agricultural pollution is characterized by imperfect monitoring. If one treats 
environmental quality as a public good then one is clearly dealing in terms of resource 
allocation with an imperfect public equilibrium.  
2 The Model 
In this paper we extend a version of the Tullock rent-seeking model with the outcome of the 
lobbying game being improved environmental quality as a result of a particular policy, the 
policy could be a tax or it could be a legislative measure designed to restrict pollution. There 
are two political groups one in favour of the new measure because they stand to benefit more 
from improved environmental quality and one opposed because they stand to lose from the 
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economic imposition of the new policy. We assume that one group consumes the public good 
environmental quality and that the other group discharges pollutant and does not value the 
environment at all. The set-up is similar to Anderson and Siwan (1997) and Beard (2006).  
 
The model can be conceived of as a multi-stage game. In each stage of the game information 
about environmental quality becomes available through monitoring. Monitoring of 
environmental quality will be either a publicly observable signal or privately observed 
signals. In the first stage of the game politicians propose a policy measure in the form of a 
penalty. We do not explicitly model this stage in this version of the paper. We simply assume 
that self-interested politicians have proposed this penalty in their own interest. In a second 
stage of the game an electoral contest (via political lobbying) occurs between politicians 
associated with particular interest groups (producers opposed to the penalty and consumers in 
favour of the penalty). Once the outcome of the election is known producers and consumers 
make appropriate production and consumption decisions in a third stage of the game. The 
model is solved via backwards induction. Firms (farmers) make production decisions and 
households (consumers) make consumption decisions. Farms are assumed to generate a non-
point source pollutant which is detrimental to a public good environmental quality and 
consequently diminishes consumer welfare. In the second stage both farmers and consumers 
lobby regarding the imposition of a possibly policy measure that will penalize farmers in an 
effort to reduce the extent of environmental damage that is induced by farming activity.  
 
The farmer’s profit maximizing problem is given by: 
( )maxa a pa caγΠ = −  
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where p is the price received for the crop, a the chosen action of the farmer, e.g. fertilizer 
application and c a cost associated with that action and γ an elasticity of production 
parameter. 
 
The optimal rate of fertilizer application is then given by: 
1
1
*
−






=
γ
γp
c
a                                                                                                             (1) 
 
Consumers maximize utility by consuming a private good and a desired level of public good 
so environmentalists’ utility is given by 
 
( ) βα zazaU ii =,                                                                                                    (2) 
where βα , represent elasticities of substitution. 
Consumers face a budget constraint (alternatively this can be interpreted as a linear 
production possibility frontier that transforms private goods into public goods where despite 
appearances the public good z should not be interpreted as possessing a price): 
 
zqaB ii +=                                                                                                          (3) 
where q is a transformation parameter. 
Rearranging and substituting 
 
The following Utility function is obtained 
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( ) β
α
zz
qq
B
zaU ii 


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

−=
1
,                                                                                       (4) 
 
The optimal household consumption of the public good environmental quality is then given 
by 
 
Bz βα
β
+
=0                                                                                                   (5) 
 
Before turning to the lobbying stage-game, we need to discuss environmental monitoring. 
We draw on the literature on imperfect private monitoring in repeated games to establish a 
framework for environmental monitoring. 
 
Following Kandori (2002) we introduce a monitoring signal ii Ω∈ω received by the i-th 
agent, this may be either a farmer or a consumer at this stage. In the public monitoring case 
ω is identical for all agents (farmers and consumers). In other words everyone has the same 
information about environmental quality and there are no disputes regarding information. In 
previous work reported in Beard (2006) the issue of political conflict regarding possible 
impacts of agricultural non-point source pollution was analysed as an environmental 
lobbying game applied to Queensland’s Great Barrier Reef. In that game although interest 
groups differed it was implicitly assumed that agents had the same information regarding 
environmental quality. Typically interest groups disagree about information as well. Under 
perfect monitoring the signal received by each agent ∑−=
n
i
ii az0ω , where n is the number 
 8 
of firms (farmers). If there are observation errors then this signal will be perturbed by an 
error term. The question is exactly how it will be perturbed and this depends on whether one 
is monitoring environmental quality or whether one is monitoring individual behaviour. In 
point source pollution it is relatively easy to monitor individual emission levels. In the case 
of non-point source pollution, this cannot be done efficiently although inputs could be 
monitored. In what follows we will examine the case of input monitoring which is the basis 
of input controls as a policy measure and we will also examine the case in which 
environmental quality is monitored. The latter, if imperfect, corresponds to the case of 
imperfect public monitoring and the former to the case of imperfect private monitoring. 
 
In the second-stage farmers choose lobbying effort by maximizing the expected benefits from 
unrestricted application of fertilizer and restricted application of fertilizer. So that the 
expected payoff to farmers is represented by: 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]ii eapeapE −ΠΠ+−ΠΠ=Π ''*** |'|                                                                (6) 
where: 
( )
∑∑
∑
==
=
+
=Π
m
j
j
n
i
i
n
i
i
le
e
ap
11
1** | is the probability of a pollution mitigation policy not succeeding 
electorally  and ( ) −=Π 1|' 'ap ( )** | ap Π  is the probability of such a policy succeeding .    
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If environmental quality is given by the preferred level of environmental quality  0z  net of 
any external impact: ∑−
n
i
iaz0 , then if monitoring is perfect and public all agents receive the 
signal ∑−=
n
i
iaz0ω . If the status-quo is unchanged farmers receive ie−Π
*
 and don’t care 
about measurement of environmental quality. If however a restrictive policy is imposed then 
monitoring of environmental quality does matter to them. The profit in the case of a 
restrictive policy is ( )ωθ−Π=Π *' , where ( )ωθ  is a government imposed penalty on profit 
that depends on the perceived signal. If environmental quality is not measured correctly, 
then 





−= ∑
n
i
iaz0δω , where δ  is the probability of correctly measuring environmental 
quality and is a random variable with support [0, ∞), mean 1 and constant variance. This 
corresponds to the case of imperfect public monitoring of environmental quality.  The 
penalty is assumed to take the form ( ) θωωθ = . Substituting the farmers expected utility from 
lobbying is given by 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]ii eapeapE −−ΠΠ+−ΠΠ=Π θω*'*** |'|      (7) 
We will leave informational distinction to the later discussion and turn now to consumer 
behaviour. Firstly, it should be remarked that while consumers can send signals about 
environmental quality the signal does not depend on consumer actions. This is because 
consumers are assumed to be on the receiving end of the externality in our model. If 
consumers can also signal then this will only matter in the case of private monitoring, this is 
because ji ωω = , for all i,j and 





−= ∑
i
iaz0δω regardless. In the private monitoring case 
we need to make some assumptions as to who is monitoring the environment where. Assume 
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farmers monitor the environmental quality at source (input monitoring) so that under 
imperfect private monitoring ∑−=
j
jiji az δω 0 where ijδ is the probability of the i-th agent 
correctly measuring environmental quality at the j-th source and is distributed as previously 
discussed. Knowledge of environmental quality depends on farmers communicating with 
each-other we will come back to this point when we discuss mediated and unmediated 
communication and the role it plays. Consumers on the other hand cannot monitor 
environmental quality at source (trespass laws apply) instead they monitor environmental 
quality at the point of consumption after the environment has been affected by pollution, 
so 





−= ∑
i
i
c
ii az0δω , where ciδ  is the monitoring error of consumers. This differs from the 
individual monitoring error of farmers.  Another interpretation of monitoring error here is 
that these correspond to consumer and individual producer beliefs about environmental 
quality. 
 
From this we then obtain the expected utility of the environmentalist: 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]jjj lUaUplUaUpEU −+−= ''*** |'|                                                              (8) 
 
where: 
( )
∑∑
∑
==
=
+
=
m
j
j
n
i
i
m
j
j
le
l
aUp
11
1** |  and ( ) −= 1| '' aUp ( )** | aUp  Are the probabilities that farmers 
will be successful in their lobbying effort and unsuccessful in their lobbying effort 
respectively and *U  is the indirect utility function obtained from the previous optimization 
but with consumer welfare now affected by the perceive level of the public good, 
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consequently environmental monitoring has an impact on consumer welfare. Whether or not 
pollution mitigation measures are implemented after lobbying consumers are concerned 
about environmental monitoring, if no policy measure is implemented they are concerned as 
it impact on their welfare and if a policy is adopted then they are concerned because they 
wish to know if it works or not.  
 
Consequently, ( ) ( )βα ωω *0*** 1, 





−== z
qq
B
aUU i
i
. How the signal depends on farmer 
behaviour depends on whether or not farmers have won the political contest, so that optimal 
fertilizer application rates will be adjusted to account for any penalty imposed on farmers by 
government. This completes the outline of the model.  In the following we derive the 
politico-economic equilibrium in lobbying effort for each information scenario and compare 
them. 
 
3 Perfect Public Politico-Economic Equilibrium 
 
In a perfect public politico-economic equilibrium δ=1 because environmental quality is now 
perfectly observable. We first derive the politico-economic lobbying equilibrium under this 
assumption. This gives us a theoretical benchmark against which to compare the other 
equilibria that we will obtain when we assume less than perfect mo9nitoring of 
environmental quality.  
 
Farmers maximize 
 ( )[ ] ( )[ ]ii eapeapE −−ΠΠ+−ΠΠ=Π θω*'*** |'|  
 
by choosing ei . We will assume symmetry throughout, so that after substituting probabilities 
we obtain: 
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[ ] [ ]e
mlne
ne
e
mlne
neE −−Π





+
−+−Π
+
=Π θω** 1  
 
where ( )*0 naz −=ω  and 1
1
*
−






=
α
αp
c
a .  
 
The first-order condition for this are given by (after substitution) 
 
( ) [ ]
( )
( ) [ ] 01
)(
'*
2
2
*
2
2
=−−−Π
+
−+
−−Π
+
−+
=
∂
∂
e
mlne
enmlnen
e
mlne
enmlnen
e
EU θω  
Solving for e and assuming e to be non-negative one obtains: 
 
( ) ( )
n
nmlml
le
*θω+−
=                                                                                   
Which will be non-negative if environmental damage is positive and ( )
n
ml≥*θω  in other 
words if environmental damage exceeds the ratio of the size of the two lobbying groups time 
the lobbying effort of environmentalists. Interesting is that the lobbying effort depends solely 
on the amount of environmental damage and the lobbying effort of the interest group. 
 
Similarly the reaction function of the environmentalists to lobbying by farmers can be 
derived. Assuming symmetry the objective function of the environmentalists is given by: 
 
[ ] [ ]lU
mlne
nelU
mlne
neEU −



+
−+−
+
=
'* 1  
 
maximizing this one obtains the first-order condition: 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 01'2*2 =−−++−+
−
=
∂
∂ lU
mlne
nemlU
mlne
nem
l
EU
 
 
From this one obtains only one positive real valued reaction function for the 
environmentalists: 
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( ) ( )
m
UUnemne
el
*'
−+−
=                                                                                 
The indirect utility function of consumers is ( ) ( )βα ωβα
α
ω **** , 





+
==
q
B
aUU
i
, recall that 
how the signal depends on farmer behaviour depends on whether or not farmers have won 
the political contest, so that optimal fertilizer application rates will be adjusted to account for 
any penalty imposed on farmers by government. Consequently, 'U  is obtained by first 
resolving the farmers profit maximizing problem taking into account the impact of a penalty 
on farmer behaviour. Therefore farmers solve: 
( ) 





−
+
−−=Π naBcapaaa βα
βθγmax   
where p is the price received for the crop, a the chosen action of the farmer, e.g. fertilizer 
application and c a cost associated with that action. 
 
The optimal rate of fertilizer application is then given by: 
1
1
'
−





 −
=
γ
γ
θ
p
nc
a     
So that fertilizer application is now reduced. Consequently, the consumers’ indirect utility 
function is given by 
( ) ( )βα ωβα
α
ω **** , 





+
==
q
B
aUU
i
in the unrestricted case and in the restricted case by 
( ) ( )βα ωβα
α
ω ''*' , 





+
==
q
B
aUU
i
. 
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The politico-economic equilibrium is given by equating the reaction functions and solving 
for (e,l). Clearly, *' UU > and this can be verified by inspection. So that the lobbying effort 
will be positive for both interest groups. 
 
Proposition 1: 
( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]2*''
2*'
* '
UUmn
UUnml
−+
−
=
θω
θω
 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]2*'
2
'*'
*
' UUmn
UUnm
e
−+
−
=
θω
θω
 
 
Proof: See Hillman and Ursprung (1988). 
■ 
Each of the different informational scenarios, consists now of a special case. 
Case 1: Perfect public equilibrium:  
( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]2*''
2*'
* '
UUmn
UUnml
−+
−
=
θω
θω
 
( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]2*'
2
'*'
*
' UUmn
UUnm
e
−+
−
=
θω
θω
 
The equilibrium will be independent of monitoring error delta because delta =1 and this is 
also the case for consumer perceptions of environmental quality. In what follows producers 
will behave the same however consumers will be affected by imperfect monitoring of 
environmental quality. 
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Case 2: Imperfect public Equilibrium 
In the case of imperfect public monitoring things are more interesting. 
farmers solve: 
( ) ( ) 





−
+
−−=Π naBEcapaaa βα
βδθγmax   
where p is the price received for the crop, a the chosen action of the farmer, e.g. fertilizer 
application and c a cost associated with that action. However, the principle of legal certainty 
requires that government not penalize farmers randomly. Consequently, government must 
penalize farmers by some constant amount. The penalty function cannot therefore depend on 
δ, however it could depend on a given realization of delta or better still on the mean value of 
some sample of measures of environmental quality ( )δE . Assuming an unbiased monitoring 
instrument ( ) 1=δE .  
The optimal rate of fertilizer application is then given by: 
1
1
'
−





 −
=
γ
γ
θ
p
nc
a     
 













 −
−
+
=
−1
1
'
γ
γ
θ
βα
βδω
p
nc
nB , so substituting one obtains:  
( )
( )
2
*'
2*
*
1
1
1
1
'








−+





















 −
−
+
−





















 −
−
+
=
−
−
UUm
p
nc
nBn
UU
p
nc
nBnm
l
γ
γ
γ
θ
βα
βθ
γ
θ
βα
βθ
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( )
( )
2
*
2
*'
*
'
1
1
1
1








−+





















 −
−
+





















 −
−
+
−
=
−
−
UUm
p
nc
nBn
p
nc
nBUUnm
e
γ
γ
γ
θ
βα
βθ
γ
θ
βα
βθ
 
Recall that the signal ω  has variance ( )δ
γ
θ
βα
β γ
var
2
1
1













 −
−
+
−
p
nc
nB , so 
( ) ( )δ
γ
θ
βα
β
ω
γ
varvar
2
1
1













 −
−
+
=
−
p
nc
nB  therefore 
2
1
1













 −
−
+
−γ
γ
θ
βα
β
p
nc
nB ( )( )
2
var
var






==
δ
ω
σ
σ
δ
ω
. The equilibrium can now be simplified to 
( )
( )
2
*'
2*
*
'






−+





−





=
UUmn
UUnm
l
δ
ω
δ
ω
σ
σθ
σ
σθ
 
and 
( )
( )
2
*
2
2*'
*
' 





−+











−
=
UUmn
UUnm
e
δ
ω
δ
ω
σ
σθ
σ
σθ
 
Note that after substituting into the indirect utilities these become: 














−











+
=











+
−











+
=−
β
δ
ω
β
δ
ω
α
β
β
δ
ω
αβ
δ
ω
α
σ
σ
σ
σ
βα
αδ
σ
σδβα
α
σ
σδβα
α
*
*
*
*
*
'
q
B
q
B
q
BUU
Delta now appears because monitoring error affects consumer perceptions of environmental 
 17 
quality, although principles of the rule of law such as that of legal certainty prevent 
monitoring error having a direct impact on imposed penalties.  
 
Note also that the signal and measurement process are different depending on whether the 
penalty has been imposed on farmers or not. Scientists will measure different levels of 
environmental damage in each of these cases and consumers will observe different levels of 
environmental quality. 
 
So how does the equilibrium change as the ratio of the standard deviation of the perceived 
signal increases with respect to the standard deviation of the monitoring process? This ratio is 
a measure of lay uncertainty compared to scientific sagacity. Another way of interpreting it is 
in terms of people’s scepticism about science. The larger this ratio, the more uncertain people 
are about the accuracy of measurements concerning environmental damage. The easiest way 
to answer this question is to differentiate the equilibrium values with respect to our consumer 
uncertainty ratio and then establish the sign of the derivative. To obtain a tractable solution 
we examine the case of a multiplicative utility function, i.e. we set 1== βα and examine 
how a change in the quality of the signal would have an impact on the trivial equilibrium of 
zero lobbying effort. We analyse this equilibrium as a limiting case of the more general 
equilibrium. One way to think about this is that the zero lobbying case is a benchmark, 
implementation of the proposed policy to penalize farmers’ results in a monitoring problem 
with respect to the effectiveness of the policy. Would an increase in people’s trust of 
scientific information lead to an increase or a decrease in lobbying effort on the part of 
producers and consumers and therefore shift the equilibrium? What information induces 
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people to become politically active? Does the level of their scepticism about scientific 
information play a role in this? 
First notice that if utility is multiplicative 1== βα  so that after substituting 






=














−











=











−











=−
δ
ω
δ
ω
δ
ω
δ
ω
δ
ω
σ
σ
εδ
σ
σ
σ
σδ
σ
σδ
σ
σδ
q
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ε  is the change in peoples scepticism about scientific information that is 
induced by the proposed policy, this depends linearly on the level of scepticism. 
 
Propostion 2: An increase in exogenous public scepticism of scientific monitoring of 
environmental quality has no impact on consumer lobbying in the zero lobbying equilibrium.  
Proof: 
Substituting the expression for the change in consumer utility due to a change in policy into 
the equilibrium expressions gives: 
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Differentiating lobbying effort with respect to the ratio of standard deviations and taking the 
limit of the derivative as ε approaches zero allows us to evaluate the change in lobbying 
effort away from no political activity to becoming politically active due to an increase in 
scepticism about science. 
The result is  
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This last expression is just the indirect utility of consumers due to private consumption scaled 
by the ratio of consumers to producers and accuracy of environmental monitoring.  
 
Farm lobbies become political active in an environment of increasing scepticism about what 
science has to say about environmental quality and when farmers are relatively small in 
number compared with consumers. Consumers on the other hand would appear to remain 
unmoved by the degree of public scepticism. 
 
A similar approach can be taken to analysing the impact that a change in the degree of 
scientific scepticism due to a policy shift may have on lobbying effort. Science driven policy 
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changes engender increased scepticism about science due to the economic interests of the 
affected parties.  
Proposition 3: An increase in policy induced public scepticism of scientific monitoring of 
environmental quality has no impact on consumer lobbying in the zero lobbying equilibrium.  
Proof: Differentiating the equilibrium expression with respect to ε and evaluating the 
derivative at ε=0 gives 0
0
*
=
∂
∂
=ε
ε
l
. ■ 
Consequently the zero lobbying equilibrium is stable with respect to any policy instrument 
increase in scientific scepticism. This result is somewhat surprising as it implies that 
consumers will not respond directly to any increase in scepticism arising from the policy 
itself. Consumer scepticism about scientific evidence appears to be exogenous to the policy 
process itself. 
Proposition 4: 
q
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Proof: Differentiating the equilibrium expression with respect to ε and evaluating the 
derivative at ε=0 gives the desired result.■ 
 
In this case producers will deviate from the zero lobbying equilibrium in response to an 
increase in public scepticism about monitoring of environmental quality proportional to the 
private component of consumers indirect utility. Producers’ decisions to begin lobbying are 
therefore affected by increased public scepticism about the quality of environmental 
monitoring. This is in clear contrast to consumers. The conclusion here is that producers are 
likely to respond in a far more sensitive manner to public scepticism about the quality of 
scientific monitoring of environmental quality than consumers. The key driver here is not 
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improved accuracy in the measurement of environmental quality δσ becoming smaller 
although this clearly plays a role but public perception of environmental quality relative to 
the accuracy of monitoring. Public perception is influenced by both endogenous policy 
factors as well as exogenous factors that go beyond the immediate policy context. Producers 
respond to both of these pathways but consumers appear to be solely responsive to 
exogenous factors. Consequently, consumers care little about the size of policy impacts and 
whether perceived levels of variation in monitoring environmental quality are impacted by 
these, producers on the other hand are highly sensitive.  
We next turn to case 3 and examine how private monitoring on the part of producers and 
consumers affects the politico-economic equilibrium. 
 
Case 3: Imperfect Private Monitoring 
( )( )
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−
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the signal is then substituted into this assuming a symmetric equilibrium. Consumers and 
producers receive different signals. The farmer receives the following signal: 
anz δω −= 0 .  
Consumers on the other hand receive: 
( )nazc −= 0δω  
Farmers solve: 
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where p is the price received for the crop, a the chosen action of the farmer, e.g. fertilizer 
application and c a cost associated with that action. Note that in this formulation the penalty 
is based on reported demands for the public good net of farmers reported fertilizer 
application rates, as reported for example by an extension officer familiar with farm practice. 
Consumer perceptions are not used to determine the level of penalty. If delta is now 
interpreted as a given realization of monitoring error characteristic of how well farmers are 
informed but constant, then we can distinguish three cases of interest, farmers have an 
unbiased estimate of environmental quality. They consistently, underestimate the damage 
they cause or they consistently overestimate the damage they cause.  The argument 
concerning legal certainty can no longer be used here. A polluting producer facing a possible 
penalty is likely to underestimate any damage caused. Private monitoring does not imply 
private compliance.  Policy still needs to address the issue of compliance. 
  
The optimal rate of fertilizer application is then given by: 
1
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So that fertilizer application is now reduced and the signal received by farmers becomes 
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Because the signal is now non-linear in delta we can only with difficulty establish a 
relationship between the variance of the signal and variance of monitoring error. However if 
we assume farmers know their own beliefs about the damage they cause and that these are 
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essentially constant and not random. Then we can determine the variance of the signal 
received by consumers similarly to the way in which we did this in the imperfect public 
monitoring case. Another way to interpret this is that we can derive the variance and standard 
deviation of the marginal distribution of the signal received by consumers. This is done as 
follows: 
First consider the signal received by consumers ( )nazc −= 0δω , fertilizer application rate a 
is now considered constant (we are only analysing the marginal distribution). The variance of 
the signal is therefore, ( ) ( ) ( )cVarnazVar δω 20 −= , so naBnaz
c
−
+
=−= βα
β
σ
σ
δ
ω
0 which is 
now interpreted as the degree of scientific scepticism of consumers alone. 
Or for a multiplicative utility function 
na
B
c
−=
2δ
ω
σ
σ
, where a may be either the fertilizer application rate after penalty 'a or the 
fertilizer application rate without penalty *a . 
Note  that, the consumers’ indirect utility function is given by 
( ) ( )βα ωω ****
2
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in the unrestricted case (theta=0) and in the restricted case 
(theta > 0) by ( ) ( )βα ωω ''*'
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. 
Recall that consumers cannot monitor environmental quality at source (trespass laws apply) 
instead they monitor environmental quality at the point of consumption after the environment 
has been affected by pollution, so  ( )nazc −= 0δω  assuming symmetry.  
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Substituting the signals and indirect utilities into the equilibrium expressions and assuming 
multiplicative utility we get: 
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Notice also that  
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Substituting and simplifying in we get:  
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'
2
an
B δ−  is the difference between the consumer demand for private consumption and the 
total external cost that producers perceive that they impose upon consumers. When this is 
premultiplied by the penalty rate this can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of 
consumption or alternatively as a deadweight loss borne by consumers that is associated with 
the policy instrument. ( )'*
2
aa
q
B
−  is the consumer demand for private consumption times the 
reduction in applied fertilizer. When premultiplied by the consumers’ belief regarding 
environmental quality this can be interpreted as the perceived gain to consumers from the 
policy in terms of private goods. Consequently lobbying is a ratio of private losses times the 
square of private gains to the square of a weighted sum of private losses to private gains from 
the policy. The weights are given by the penalty parameter and the size of the consumer 
interest group.  
 
Farmers optimal lobbying effort is given by  
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This says lobbying effort of farmers is the ratio of private benefits due to introducing the 
penalty time the square of private opportunity costs divided by a weighted sum of private 
opportunity costs net of externalities and private benefits of changed fertilizer use due to the 
imposition of the penalty. The weights imposed are in both cases the size of the penalty 
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parameter and the size of the consumer interest group. Alternatively, expressing the 
equilibrium in terms of consumer scepticism we get: 
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What impact does consumer scepticism about the quality of environmental monitoring now 
have on the politico-economic equilibrium? 
 
Proposition 5: An increase in exogenous consumer scepticism of scientific monitoring of 
environmental quality has no impact on consumer lobbying in the zero lobbying equilibrium.  
Proof: Differentiating lobbying effort with respect to the ratio of standard deviations and 
taking the limit of the derivative as ε approaches zero allows us to evaluate the change in 
lobbying effort away from no political activity to becoming politically active due to an 
increase in scepticism about science. 
The result is  
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This result does not differ from the imperfect public equilibrium case. The same cannot be 
said for the impact of consumer scepticism on farmers propensity to become politically 
active.  
Proposition 6 Under private monitoring farmers propensity to become politically active in 
response to consumer scepticism about scientific evidence is greater than their propensity to 
become politically active under public monitoring if the number of farmers is greater than the 
ratio of farmer beliefs about environmental quality to consumer beliefs about environmental 
quality. 
Proof: Differentiating lobbying effort with respect to the ratio of standard deviations and 
taking the limit of the derivative as ε approaches zero allows us to evaluate the change in 
lobbying effort away from no political activity to becoming politically active due to an 
increase in scepticism about science. The result is 
q
B
m
e c
2
lim
*
0
δ
σ
σ
δ
ω
ε
=





∂
∂
→
comparing this with the imperfect public monitoring result 
q
B
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2
δ and 
simplifying we obtain for response of farmers to consumer uncertainty to be greater than the 
response of farmers to public uncertainty, that 
c
n δ
δ
>  or the number of farmers must be 
greater than the ratio of farmer beliefs about environmental quality to consumer beliefs about 
environmental quality.   
 
Farmers are likely to underestimate fertilizer application rates and consumers overestimate 
damage, i.e. underestimate the available environmental quality. So both delta’s are likely to 
be less than 1. If farmers are relatively well informed about each others actions but 
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consumers relatively ill-informed and if the number of farmers is sufficiently small then  
farmers are likely to have a low propensity for political activity under private monitoring 
compared with public monitoring (the inequality will be reversed). Consequently, we can 
conclude that public monitoring is more likely to encourage farm activism than private 
monitoring in the real world (real world here means a world in which there are a small 
number of relatively well-informed farmers and a large number of relatively ill-informed 
consumers).  The opposite would hold for a world in which consumers were better informed 
than farmers.  
 
What role does extension play in this? Extension influences the standard deviation of the 
signal perceived by farmers. In a world of public monitoring extension can influence 
farmer’s propensity to political activism but not that of consumers. In a world of private 
monitoring extension has no impact when it targets farmers. Targeting consumers through 
extension programmes could however have an impact on the political activism of farmers by 
allaying their fears about anti-scientific green consumer groups. A more effective form of 
extension under private monitoring would be to promote the use of soil monitoring 
technology amongst farmers and thereby increase the accuracy of scientific monitoring. To 
some extent this is where things have been heading.  
   
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we have extended a Tullock game of environmental lobbying to the case of 
imperfect monitoring of environmental quality. We have considered three cases: perfect 
monitoring of environmental quality, imperfect public monitoring of environmental quality 
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and imperfect private monitoring of environmental quality. In the first case the equilibrium 
will be independent of monitoring error delta because delta =1 and this is also the case for 
consumer perceptions of environmental quality. In the second case we were able to prove 
that consumers would not respond to increased scepticism about scientific evidence by 
increasing lobbying effort, however farmers are sensitive to the degree of scepticism about 
scientific information and are likely to become politically active in response to scepticism 
about scientific evidence, whether this is induced by a proposed policy or is exogenous to the 
policy process. In the third case, we have provided an interpretation of the politico-economic 
equilibrium in terms of opportunity costs to consumers and gains to consumers due to the 
imposition of a penalty on farmers. Perceived opportunity costs under imperfect monitoring 
relative to true opportunity costs to consumers play a role in this. Interesting is that 
opportunity costs here are in terms of private consumption net of the external effect and gains 
to consumers are in terms of a wealth effect on consumers that can be attributed to a reduced 
externality effect. 
 
The results have implications for extension programmes and the choice of public versus 
private monitoring of non-point source pollution. In a world of public monitoring extension 
can influence farmers’ propensity to political activism but not that of consumers’. In a world 
of private monitoring extension has no impact when it targets farmers. Targeting consumers 
through extension programmes could however have an impact on the political activism of 
farmers by allaying their fears about anti-scientific green consumer groups. A more effective 
form of extension under private monitoring would be to promote the use of soil erosion 
monitoring technology amongst farmers and thereby increase the accuracy of scientific 
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monitoring. To some extent this is where much of the on-farm monitoring efforts have been 
heading. More work is needed to explore these results further. 
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